In October 2011 the European Commission presented a set of legal proposals designed to make the Common Agricultural Policy more effective. Pending a debate in the European Parliament and the Council, approval is expected by the end of 2013. This Forum aims to identify the proposals' shortcomings and to offer suggestions for improvement which the Parliament and Council can work to implement. The authors pay particular attention to the future of direct payments, CAP greening and rural development, as well as to the change in the decision-making rules which grants the Parliament more authority over the process.
Where Is the Common Agricultural Policy Heading?
direct payments. Further reforms led to the removal after the mid-2000s of almost all links between the lump sum direct payments granted to farmers and production. Today, an intervention system exists only for bread wheat and dairy products, with strict limitations on the quantities eligible and a price so low that it has been inactive for almost a decade in the case of wheat. With the exception of border tariffs -which remain high in the dairy, beef and sugar sectors -the entire EU farm support policy is now based on direct payments, decoupled from production and subject to cross-compliance, i.e. to respect for conditions regarding the environment, animal welfare and worker safety.
In the 1990s, the Commission also pushed for a "rural development" policy. This is often called the "second pillar" of the CAP and relies on the idea that agriculture provides services, public goods and potential positive externalities that deserve to be funded. The corresponding budget covers a variety of measures. In Western Europe, it is mostly agri-environmental measures and support of extensive forms of agriculture in regions with a natural handicap (e.g. mountainous and northern areas). In new member states, the corresponding budget funds some "modernisation" of agriculture. More generally, environmental issues have now become more central to the CAP, even though there are large differences between countries. A characteristic of the rural development policy is that it is co-fi nanced by the member states in order to provide an incentive to good supervision and control by local authorities, while Pillar 1 measures, which sup-The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is now more than fi fty years old. The initial objectives included fostering agricultural productivity, ensuring a fair standard of living to farmers and securing food availability. These objectives have, in practice, been complemented by new ones, in particular in the environmental area, refl ecting societal demands that have emerged in recent decades.
The historical CAP relied on market management. From the early 1960s to the 1990s, most of the agricultural sectors were subject to administratively set prices, requiring that EU authorities purchase excess production. With the growth in production resulting from frequent increases in institutional prices and a high rate of technical change that lowered costs, managing surplus became the main problem in the 1980s. The budget devoted to storage expanded rapidly. The EU subsidised the disposal of excess production abroad, another source of large budget expenditure as well as of world market distortions that triggered international disputes and retaliations. This intervention system reached its limits when the pork and poultry sector fed animals with cheaper import substitutes to cereals, while the EU taxpayer had to buy and subsidise the export of domestic wheat and barley which were no longer consumed locally. Eventually, the budgetary problems became so critical that the EU Commission convinced the Council to pass a drastic reform in 1992. The lowering of intervention prices in 1993 was the fi rst of a continuous fl ow of reforms that led to the progressive dismantling of the intervention system and the end of the export subsidies. Farmers were compensated via ing farmers' incomes with payments that are as close to production-neutral as possible.
The Commission proposal appears modest to those who expected a major reform. 3 The budget framework proposed by the Commission in June 2011 would maintain the CAP budget in nominal terms, i.e. an impressive €44 billion a year for the fi rst pillar and €14 billion for the second pillar. The main CAP features remain in place. The intervention system is maintained for bread wheat, butter and skimmed milk powder with (rather small) maximum quantities purchased, making this measure a simple safety net. A package to deal with crises would be implemented, with a tendering process for barley, maize, rice and beef, and a simple private storage aid for sugar, olive oil, fl ax, beef, butter, skimmed milk powder, pork and sheep meat. These measures would be funded from a €3.5 billion "crisis reserve" separate from the CAP budget. There would be some measures to extend the recognition of producers' organisations and secure their legal framework so that they could gain bargaining power ahead of the downstream sector. The Commission pro-3 E.g. G. A n a n i a : The European Union's Common Agricultural Policy After 2013. What is likely to be the outcome of the policy decision process and why. Paper presented at the 28th IAAE Congress, Foz de Iguaçu, 8-24 August 2012; L.-P. M a h é : Do the proposals for the CAP after 2013 herald a 'major' reform?, Policy paper 53, Notre Europe, Paris 2012. port production and income, are fully fi nanced by the EU. The management of Pillar 2 measures is also more complex, requiring multiannual programming, inspection and control and resulting in high administration costs. This is particularly a problem for member states where there are still a large number of very small farms.
The Evolution of the CAP
The general path towards greater exposure to market signals, reduced government intervention and more decoupled assistance to farmers that characterises 20 years of CAP reform is still criticised by many farmers' organisations. It was nevertheless the least bad of all possible policies, and no credible alternative has been proposed since. In the ongoing process of defi ning the future CAP for the 2013-2020 period, critics of the market orientation put forward that this liberalisation has generated the price variability now experienced by EU farmers. They also put forward that the United States, which pioneered the move to decoupled payments, has undergone a complete turnaround. In its recent farm bills, the USA reverted to instruments that are more linked to market conditions and yields, and the proposals tabled by Congress for the 2012 Farm Bill go further to protect farmers from adverse situations. 1 These arguments fi nd an echo in member states and in the European Parliament.
In the EU, the institutional setting is such that the Commission has a monopoly on drafting CAP reform proposals. However, decisionmaking remains in the hands of the Council (representatives of member states) and the EP. The latter has gained considerable power recently and now has full co-decision authority with the Council on agricultural issues. In its proposals for CAP reform, released in October 2011, the Commission integrated the outcome of large public consultations and the reactions of both the EP and the Council to preliminary versions. 2 In particular, the concerns of the Ministers of Agriculture as well as the Agricultural Committee of the EP regarding price fl uctuations were taken into account. So was the risk of leaving European farmers dependent on market forces while their US counterparts will benefi t from many systems of insurance, countercyclical payments and "shallow loss" payments. However, the Commission has so far resisted pressures to reverse the orientation that CAP reforms have followed for 20 years, i.e. support-
